



GLOBAL POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY

Populism and World Politics

Exploring Inter- and Transnational Dimensions

Edited by

Frank A. Stengel · David B. MacDonald
and Dirk Nabers



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are affected by the rise of populist parties and movements, at least insofar as these movements' policy positions differ from the current elites they attack. And, to be sure, there is a good reason to assume that the latter is the case. Not only are right-wing populists often opposed to both, international political cooperation (certainly integration) and free trade, but also left-wing populists often also criticize certain aspects of international cooperation. It stands to reason that (at least under certain circumstances) increased influence by populists on government policy might lead to foreign policy change. This in turn affects the possibility of cooperation and conflict, the persistence of international normative orders, and so on. Systematically enquiring into the populism-world politics nexus will contribute to our understanding of a large number of phenomena IR is traditionally concerned with, and that makes the book highly relevant for a general IR audience.

In the previous eighteen months, this edited volume has gradually gained substance, and it would not have become possible without the help of a number of people. At Kiel, Dirk's research assistants Merve Genç and Malte Kayßer did an excellent job in wiping out most of the typing mistakes and synchronizing the format of the individual chapters. At Guelph, David's research assistant Jackie Gillis helped with proofreading and English language revision. Also, we would like to thank Alex Walker and Andrea Getlak for their assistance in bringing about the ISA working group out of which this volume grew.

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CONTENTS

1	Introduction: Analyzing the Nexus Between Populism and International Relations Frank A. Stengel, David B. MacDonald and Dirk Nabers	1
Part I Theoretical Issues in Global Populism Research		
2	Populism Beyond the Nation Jan Zemann	25
3	How to Become a Leader: Identifying Global Repertoires for Populist Leadership María Esperanza Casullo	55
4	Populism and Contemporary Global Media: Populist Communication Logics and the Co-construction of Transnational Identities Precious N. Chatterje-Doodly and Rhys Crilly	73

- Part II Populism and Foreign Policy
- 5 Sedimented Practices and American Identity in Donald J. Trump's Election Campaign
Dirk Nabers and Frank A. Stengel 103
- 6 The Populist Radical Right Goes Canadian: An Analysis of Kellie Leitch's Failed 2016–2017 Conservative Party of Canada Leadership Campaign
Brian Budd 137
- 7 Populists and Foreign Policy: Evidence from Latin America
Grant Alan Burrier 165
- 8 Making (Latin) America Great Again: Lessons from Populist Foreign Policies in the Americas
Daniel F. Wajner 195
- 9 Between Populism and Pluralism: Winston Peters and the International Relations of New Zealand
David B. MacDonald 227
- 10 Conceptualizing the Links Between Populism, Nationalism and Foreign Policy: How Modi Constructed a Nationalist, Anti-establishment Electoral Coalition in India
Thorsten Wojczewski 251
- Part III Populism and International Politics
- 11 The Liberal International Order and Its Populist Adversaries in Russia, UK and USA
Robert G. Patman 277
- 12 The Global Rise of Populism as a Socio-material Phenomenon: Matter, Discourse, and Genetically Modified Organisms in the European Union
Shane Markowitz 305
- 13 Populism and Trade: The 2016 US Presidential Election and the Death of the Trans-Pacific Partnership
Amy Skonieczny 337
- 14 Conclusion: Populism, Foreign Policy, and World Politics
Frank A. Stengel, David B. MacDonald and Dirk Nabers 365
- Index 373

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LIST OF FIGURES

Fig. 7.1	Venn diagram of populism, nationalism, and protectionism	171
Fig. 7.2	Military expenditures over time	179
Fig. 7.3	Trade openness by development	181
Fig. 7.4	Tariffs by development	182
Fig. 13.1	Word cloud of relative frequency of key words for TPP, NYT Apr 1–Sept 30, 2015	354
Fig. 13.2	Word cloud of relative frequency of key words for TPP, NYT Apr 1–Sept 30, 2016	355

How to Become a Leader: Identifying Global Repertoires for Populist Leadership

Maria Esperanza Casullo

INTRODUCTION

The presence of a strong personalistic leader has almost always been considered an essential feature of populism.¹ Personalistic leadership is present in the very first descriptions of the topic. (This term can be defined in broad terms as a type of leadership in which the authority of the leader derives from the followers' beliefs in her exceptionality and not from her ability to follow institutional procedures or climb through the party ranks.²) The relation between populism and personalistic leadership is also connected to Max Weber's concept of charismatic authority. In fact, the essential connection between charismatic leaders and populist mobilization is a central feature of most contemporary theories of populism. For authors such as Kurt Weyland or Paul Taggart, charismatic leadership is one of the core features of populism. Weyland defines populism as a strategy for accumulating personal power that can be deployed at will by ambitious politicians;³ Paul Taggart states that populism "requires the most extraordinary individuals to lead the most ordinary of people".⁴ Concordantly, in the last few years a remarkable body of literature has

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focused on the role of the personal performance of the leaders, who tend to be larger-than-life, outlandish figures.⁵ For this view, it is unclear, however, which are the limits to the individual agency of the leader: is populism a strategy that is always available for everybody? Is personal virtue the only limitation to the decision to *become* a populist leader? The figure of the leader, which is central for these authors, becomes much more secondary in Ernesto Laclau's discursive theory. The discursive theory of populism focuses instead on the process by which political identities are formed. The leader—says Laclau—*becomes* the empty signifier that links together the equivalential chain insofar he expresses *something* already present in the equivalential chain, which to a degree precedes him.⁶ By describing this process in impersonal terms, Laclau wants to underscore the ways in which the leader and the followers are truly relational constructions, and the ways in which the leader himself is *transformed* into a political symbol by forces that are largely out of his control. So, if one defines populism as a *personal strategy for power accumulation*, social structures seem to recede into the background. If one defines populism as a *social discourse*, the strategic autonomy and agency of the leader disappear.

The goal of this chapter is not to resolve this tension between structure and agency but to offer, as it were, a remediation, presented in the form of a set of mid-range concepts that revolve around the notion of *repertoires*. Repertoires are defined as socially shared discursive templates that determine legitimate or accepted ways for populist leaders to act, talk, dress and that indicate what life-stories are more suitable for a politician to tell. Repertoires are socially generated and circulated but they are not totally fixed: a white, male, middle-class lawyer has the a-priori advantage of conforming to a repertoire that states what a “regular” politician looks like—however, there can be other repertoires available or in competition at a given time. If the context changes (for example in times of crisis) to look like a “regular politician” might become a disadvantage.

The thesis of the piece is that repertoires act as possible paths to leadership, that are resonant with social groups at given times and places and that they can be used by individuals to present themselves as prospective leaders. The ability of the individual to perceive and utilize these repertoires is a personal feature; the repertoires themselves are nonetheless social. What is called charisma might also be defined as a gift for reading these repertoires and for weaving the personal with the social. As Benjamin Moffitt states, such leaders are extraordinary

in that they are able to understand what ‘the people’ think and ultimately articulate their needs and desires. Yet the leader’s extraordinary symbolic function goes beyond mere articulation—in populism, the leader does not simply represent ‘the people’ but is actually seen as embodying it.⁷

These repertoires travel globally, aided by media and by the imitation effect that successful political careers have on other ambitious politicians. However, nowadays some repertoires seem to be particularly attractive or effective in different parts of the world and some repertoires seem to be associated primarily with different points of the ideological spectrum.

Four types of repertoires will be examined in this chapter: the patriotic soldier, the social leader, the successful businessman, and the strong woman. The first one was associated with the classic populist regimes of the mid-twentieth century in Latin America; the second one is associated with leftist leaders in semi-peripheral countries (mostly Latin America) at the turn of this century, while the third one seems to be more suited to right-wing leaders in Europe, the USA, and Latin America as well. The strong woman template, lastly, however, seems to be equally used in Latin America, the United States and Europe, and by left and right-wing leaders.

POPULIST LEADERSHIP AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF “OUTSIDER-NESS”

A central feature of populist leaders’ discourses is that they always present themselves as outsiders.⁸ A populist leader always constructs herself as someone uncontaminated by the vices of the “partidocracia” or the “establishment”. This is true whether or not the leader comes from an excluded group (as Evo Morales from Bolivia) or that he is a member of one of the most traditional families in the country (as was the case with Álvaro Uribe in Colombia). The quality of the narration is what matters, not its factual accuracy. The outsiderness is always a function of the discourse.

The self-presentation of the leader as someone who comes from outside is inextricable from a strong moral component. In her own narration, the leader makes the jump into politics not because of personal ambition but out of a sense of moral outrage; she is not guided by calculation or convenience but by a burning desire to serve a people who has

been damaged by an amoral élite. She presents herself as the people's redeemer, not their boss. The story of the leader's personal journey from political ignorance to political consciousness must be at the same time personally emotional and politically powerful. The alleged act of self-sacrifice and true love lies at the root of the deep connection between leader and followers—if the discourse on this love is not believed, the representative bond cannot be established. The tale of her political activation emphasizes the exceptional, charismatic and redeeming character of the leader. At the same time, and of equal importance, it underscores the leader's independence. Because she does not come from politics, she does not owe anything to anybody. Her power, as granted by the people, is hers and hers alone.⁹

However, for all the talk about charisma and exceptionality, there seem to be a non-infinite number of paths to becoming a populist leader. In different times and places, some life-narratives seem to give more currency to the speaker's claim to outsidership, love for the people and exceptionality. These preferred life-narratives are organized and shared as social repertoires. Inductively, four types seem to be specially strong and relevant.

The Patriotic Military Man

As mentioned before, every populist discourse of self-presentation must transform a given set of biographical facts into a narrative that emphasizes a story of sacrifice and redemption. One career path that has proven to be very suited to act as a platform toward populist leadership is being a military officer.

Juan Domingo Perón from Argentina, José Velasco Alvarado from Perú, Gamal Nasser from Egypt, Omar Torrijos from Panamá, Hugo Chávez from Venezuela: all of these populist politicians came to prominence while they were in the military, or they used their past careers in the armed forces as a prelude to the jump to politics. (Getulio Vargas had a brief stint in the Brazilian army as well.)

So prevalent was the "patriotic soldier" template in the first half of the twentieth century that one might argue that it was the most important path towards becoming a populist leader, at least in Latin America and parts of the third world. Probably nobody embodied this stereotype better than Juan Domingo Perón, who to this day is colloquially referred to as "el General", the General, in Argentine political vernacular. As Silvia

Signal and Eliseo Verón described, Perón constantly appealed in his discourse to his past as an officer, as somebody who was satisfied with his political life "in the barracks" and who, even though he had no ambitions, felt compelled to enter into politics due to a patriotic sense of duty in the face of the moral deterioration of his country.¹⁰ Of course Perón's account is arguably false: he was never without ambitions, and he was never a political. At least one decade before coming to power he was active in the GOLU, a semi-formal group of military officers who sought to become politically influential; he had also been a mid-rank official in the Conservative national government during the thirties. He was quite adept at day-to-day politics.

But it is useless to denounce the "falseness" of the patriotic soldier repertoire or to alert of Perón's strategic use of an available template to power. He was able to perceive that the repertoire itself was powerful and resonant in a country like Argentina that had constructed a national mythology around the figure of General San Martín and other heroes of the Independence War. (Perón was aware of and utilized this mythology, frequently celebrating the figure of San Martín and Julio Roca, among others, during his presidency.)

The "patriotic soldier" template, however, fell out of favor in Latin America around the last decades of the twentieth century, probably because the aura of the armed forces was severely tainted by the crimes and human rights violations committed by the military dictatorships of the 1970s. The armed forces in general do not enjoy the privileged symbolic position that they once had in the region. There is one notable exception to this: Hugo Chávez. Chávez was a paratrooper officer when he first attempted to grab power in Venezuela through a military coup in 1992. Even though he was not a service member when he ran for the presidency and won in 1998, he frequently underscored his military past in his public speeches. One plausible hypothesis is that, because Venezuela had not had a successful military coup in over half a century, and it was the country with the longest uninterrupted streak of civilian government in South America, it still had a more rosy vision of the armed forces. (For this and other features, Chávez's discourse was more similar to Perón's classic populism than to Morales's or the Kirchner's.)

There are no similar examples of populist "patriotic soldiers" in present-day Europe and the United States. The reason probably is that the examples of twentieth-century strong men that came to power by appropriating military symbolism (like Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini, who

were not career officers before ascending to domination but put on elaborate performances of military might nonetheless) continue to be unsavory in the eyes of large parts of the public.

The Social Leader

One populist repertoire that came to preeminence in several regions of the world at the turn of the twenty-first century has been the social leader. “Social leader” here means somebody who becomes an elected politician or tries to do so after being politically active in a social movement, specially if this movement involves protests of any kind.

Social movements gained visibility in Latin America during the seventies and eighties as they became the visible face of the anti-authoritarian struggles against the military Juntas then in power. The allure of social movements was strengthened by the anti-neoliberal reaction of the nineties, when organizations such as the *Movimiento Sin Tierra* in Brazil, the *Cocaleros* movement in Bolivia, the *Piquetero* movement in Argentina or the *Mexican Frente Zapatista de Liberación Nacional* were at the forefront of the protests against the neoliberal reforms and the rising poverty.

The sudden appeal of social leaders in the political sphere had two components: on the one hand, society became favorably predisposed toward them as the economic and social crises caused by the failure of the neoliberal reforms discredited the centrist, mainstream parties that had advocated for them.¹¹ The loss of credibility of the centrist “fiscally responsible” parties that had vouched for neoliberal macro adjustments created an opening through which outsiders could barge through. The second element was the embrace of electoral politics by anti-capitalist figures who had been ambivalent about them until not long ago. Socialism through an armed revolution was not seen as a preferable option anymore—against the almost canonic view of the left in Latin America in the sixties and seventies.

At this exceptional juncture, several social leaders who were truly outsiders ran for office in Latin America—and won. Former metalworker and longtime labor union *Lula Da Silva* was elected president of Brazil in his fourth attempt in 2002. *Cocalero*¹² activist *Evo Morales* became Bolivia’s president in 2005, even though he had been previously imprisoned because of his role in protesting US-backed coca-eradication efforts. Catholic bishop and pro-poor activist *Fernando Lugo* was elected Paraguay’s president in 2008. In Ecuador, and even though he was a

US-educated economist, *Rafael Correa* was voted president in 2006 after he became known as one of the leaders of the protest movement that ended with the government of *Lucio Gutiérrez* in the previous years.

The examples of social leaders who entered politics are not as abundant in Europe or the United States but several cases are identifiable nonetheless.¹³ Several social leaders became politicized in the context of the financial crisis of 2007 and 2008, much like in Latin America, the onset of an economic crisis, the extreme austerity measures that were taken by the “centrist” or “mainstream” parties as a response to the crisis and the loss of confidence in those parties by vast swaths of the population created an opening for the ascendance of relative outsiders to politics. Because economic crises erode the legitimacy of the governing parties and provided openings for new figures, it is maybe natural that one can find more “outsiders” rising in Latin America.¹⁴ The most important connection between populism and social movements in the West after 2008 is that of the leftist populist party “*Podemos*” in Spain, whose initial leadership came from the “*Movimiento Indignados*” that mobilized against the austerity measures that the Spanish government took in response to the financial crisis. *Podemos*, however, has not been able to break the hold of the centrist parties (PP and PSOE) on the party system and it has had to compete with another political startup, “*Ciudadanos*”. In Italy, the comedian *Beppe Grillo* started the “*Five Stars*” movement as a half-satirical, half-protest endeavor that nonetheless has evolved into an important fixture of Italian politics. (There are a number of linkages between far-right social movements and far-right populist parties in Europe as well, although they have been less examined.¹⁵)

The United States presents a fascinating, if paradoxical, case. The banking crisis of 2008 begun at Wall Street; the Occupy Wall Street movement shook the public scene in a powerful way as a reaction to the crisis and, more importantly, to the bank bailouts that were perceived by many as a handout to the very culprits who caused the crisis. Riding a wave of dissatisfaction right after the crisis, in 2008 Barack Obama was elected president. He was a relative outsider: a junior senator who had jumped into politics after years spent as a community organizer and constitutional law professor in the city of Chicago. He was not, however, the transformative and populist president that many had hoped for him to be: he never developed an antagonistic discourse and he did not attempt to achieve radical transformations. He did not seek to mobilize the left of the Democratic party; in fact, he frequently triangulated away from his own left wing. In 2016

a leftist faction of the Democratic party that echoed many of the themes of Occupy Wall Street rallied around the figure of independent senator Bernie Sanders and against Hillary Clinton, who they deemed as a neoliberal and hawkish sellout. The Sanders movement failed to gain the presidential nomination, however they succeeded in pushing Clinton to the left in many issues. Yet they felt they were cheated out of the nomination by Democratic insiders and they remain uncomfortably in the Democratic party.¹⁶ As Laura Gattan argues, Obama was elected thanks to the appeal of an almost populist promise, yet he governed “with the soul of a technocrat”.¹⁷ One might in fact argue that the presidency of Obama fed the populist energy of the Tea Party instead of the Democratic party.¹⁸

As every social leader that goes into politics can attest, there are costs in the transition from civil society to politics. In many cases the movements ends up splitting because of the “treason” that transitioning into politics-as-usual entails: in Bolivia, Felipe Quispe splintered the indigenous movement because of Evo Morales’ acceptance of the Bolivian nation-state framework and his rejection of an exclusive ethnic stance. Similarly, the indigenous movement Pachakuti broke with Rafael Correa and chose an openly opposing stance to his government.¹⁹ In Brazil some organizations within the *Partido Trabalhista* (PT) broke away after denouncing the ‘bureaucratization’ of the PT.²⁰ Lastly, the Sanders movement in the U.S. was locked in a difficult and unsatisfying relation with the Democratic party. Breaking with the party is difficult to do given the bipartisan bias of the institutional structures that organize representation in the United States, however the Sanders movement was hostile to the insider dealings that, according to them, defined the Democratic party.

All the examples discussed so far belong to the left populist camp. However, there is at least one case of a right-wing social movement that has shown itself to be enormously influential. That is the U.S. Tea Party. The Tea Party movement sprung mostly as a response to the election of the first African American president, but also involved themes of anti-financial capitalism, anti-immigration and anti-globalization. Even though it was not openly affiliated with the institutional Republican party, The Tea Party was instrumental in ushering in a crop of more radical Republican representatives in the Republican wave election of 2010. However, the Tea Party remained largely as a leaderless movement once its most prominent affiliated politician, Sarah Palin, fizzled out.²¹ The Tea Party finally found in Donald Trump somebody who was able to cater to their preferences, and its voters became his most committed

supporters. Thus, in the United States there seem to be examples of right wing and left wing social movements, however, only at the right wing of the spectrum leaders from the movements seem to have been able to successfully transition into positions of power.

The Successful Businessman

This brings us to the third repertoire which is available to aspiring leaders, the successful businessman (emphasis on man) which is closely related to what Heinisch and Saxonberg have called “entrepreneurial populism”: “political formations competing for public office that are led by charismatic business leaders, who claim that their ability to run businesses successfully means they will be able to run government well”.²² The patriotic soldier and the social leader templates seem to have power to capture the social imagination primarily in Latin America. The successful businessman template, however, has become a singularly attractive path to power in the USA, Europe, and Latin America as well. One remarkable fact is that this is an almost exclusive right-wing phenomenon. In fact, it is tempting to state that the merging of “traditional” tropes of the right regarding culture and social issues with the celebration of “successful businessmen” is the defining physiognomy of the right wing globally today.

Silvio Berlusconi and Donald Trump are two relatively recent examples of businessmen-turned-politicians that come to mind. But the repertoire has probably been the strongest imaginary formation, for almost thirty years, of what a “good” politician is in the United States. This route to politics had already been attempted by Ross Perot (the oil tycoon who in 1992 managed to be the most successful third-party candidate in over half a century).²³ Also, it must not be forgotten that George W. Bush was hailed as “the first MBA president” and “the deluge in chief” in his first presidency. But this is truly a global phenomenon. In the Czech Republic the populist billionaire Andrej Babis is pushing the country to an Euroskeptic stance. In Australia, Pauline Hanson presented herself as a successful entrepreneur before entering into politics. In Latin America, the rise of the billionaire-president has probably been the most salient feature of the last five or ten years: Sebastián Piñera in Chile, Mauricio Macri in Argentina, Horacio Cartes in Paraguay: all of them were very wealthy businessmen before being elected to the presidency.²⁴

The guiding idea in this type of leadership is not a sense of shared duty or a commitment to social justice, but technocratic efficiency without the complications of ideology. At the same time, it is very common to find the use of the 'country as a firm' trope complemented by the trope of the 'country as family', in which it is said that the nation is a household that must learn above all to 'not spend more than it earns'.

It is not by chance, therefore, that the figure of the "successful entrepreneur" implies heavily gendered connotations. Although, as noted, there are some cases of women who appeal to their entrepreneurial past to get into politics, in most cases this repertoire is associated with a certain rhetoric that exploits traditional images of "successful masculinity": these are men who display their heterosexual dominance with wives that are younger, thin and beautiful (such as the wives of Donald Trump, Michel Temer, and Mauricio Macri who were all former models) or who make a public ostentation of his many beautiful and young "conquests" (as Silvio Berlusconi did).

The old-school notion of the country as a "civilian army" wound together by a shared sense of patriotism, which required a leader with training and a military sense of duty to bring it to glory, has been replaced by the equally morally-laden idea of the country as a company that must technocratically and dispassionately be taught to compete within the global market of nations. The leader paves the way toward global competitiveness by pointing to the necessary sacrifices. He must be ruthless sometimes, because only he can translate the know-how accumulated in the capitalistic world into the political arena, unlike the politicians who are "all talk and no walk".²⁵

The Strong Woman

This brings us to the final template: the strong woman. Benjamin Moffitt argues that "while female populist leaders like Pauline Hanson and Sarah Palin have stressed their toughness and strength, they have typically combined these allegedly 'masculine' traits with attributes traditionally associated with femininity, including caring, empathy and maternalism—a phenomenon that has also been noted in the female leadership of populist parties in Scandinavia."²⁶ A slew of new populist leaders are women: Sarah Palin, Pauline Hanson, Marine Le Pen, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner—some would say Dilma Rousseff from Brazil. At first sight, they do not seem to follow one single template that unifies their style

of leadership. However, they all seem to have built their own particular script as a "strong woman". Each of these populist women has had to grapple with their own gender in ways that no male politician has had to. In the way that they talk, dress, and act, their gender is a *thing that has to be managed and a question that has to be answered*. They often try to show that their strength and resilience are based on their feminine qualities, underscoring their role as mothers and sometimes presenting themselves as protectors of the nation, yet they cannot be *too tough* of they will be deemed unappealing.

A particularly important trope is the "tough mother", whom is supposed to be a strong politician because she is predisposed to protect her family and community. Sarah Palin made good use of this trope: she linked the image of Alaska's pioneering women (portraying herself as an avid hunter, fisherwoman and runner) to her and liked to include herself and other conservatives women in a movement made of "Mama Grizzlies".²⁷ However, she always took pains to underscore her physical attractiveness and caused a splash at her first big public speech by wearing six-inches red patent-leather stiletto shoes. The "tough mom" image was always balanced with images of non-threatening traditional femininity.²⁸

There is usually a transgressive element to the flaunting of gender in the public sphere, even for women who do not openly showcase their "feminine" side as wives and mothers. Cristina Fernández de Kirchner from Argentina is another example. While she succeeded her husband, Néstor Kirchner, in the presidency, she always made clear that she was a political powerhouse on her own: she had been a well-known Senator who became famous for her fiery anti-neoliberal rhetoric. But in general she did not attend public events with her children and, for instance, remarked that she never cooked and did not like to. Cristina Fernández presented herself as first and foremost a politician and one of the members of a political partnership, and in doing so she was probably following the most important stylistic template available for female Peronist politicians, Eva Perón. Like Eva Perón, she also projected an aura of glamorous femininity: long black hair, fashionable dresses, high heels. However, in the end the way in which she dressed became one of the most powerful critiques against her: newspapers denounced her taste for expensive shoes and clothes. The fashionable side of Cristina Fernández was considered "unacceptable" by the Argentine elite.²⁹

But to not opt for the repertoires of traditional feminine attractiveness can be risky too. Marine Le Pen is another prominent populist who, as

every female politician must do, grappled with how to present herself. If previously she did not choose an overtly feminized appeal, in his last presidential campaign she famously chose a more overtly gendered image. Her campaign called her "Marine" in her videos and posters, dropping her last name; she changed her usual pantsuits for a miniskirt and was portrayed holding one of her three children. She sought to remind the onlookers of the imaginary link between her and the representation of the French republic, who is famously a woman.³⁰

To sum up: as the most recent literature on gender and populism has noticed the relation between the two is likely to contain contradictory ideas.³¹ "If populism concerns the politics of personality, then it was always been about gender and specific models of masculinity and femininity."³² These models, however, are heavily context-dependent and even ambiguous. Populist leaders and followers might advance some gender-friendly images and policies while at the same time supporting traditional images of women as family keepers and unpaid caretakers. It is also proven that women have a harder time getting to leadership roles because voters assume that a leader has to be "tough" while women are maternal and soft.³³ Judging by these examples, the "strong woman" repertoire creates an opportunity for ambitious women, but it also creates a number of pitfalls. If the woman chooses to leverage her image as a mother and wife, she can be deemed as too soft; if she tries to leverage her good looks, she might be considered unserious or frivolous; finally, if she chooses not to use a gendered appeal, she is going to be deemed as cold, unapproachable, and shrill. As Meret and Sinn have said: "leaning too much toward dominant masculine representations is perceived as being an excess, but 'inappropriate' for a woman is also to incline toward excessive markers of femininity when appearing publicly."³⁴ Every female populist must come up with a suitable answer to the question "what do I do with my gender?" which is something that no male politician must do. Gender is a *problem* to be managed more than an asset.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has tried to develop the notion of personal *repertoire* or *template*. The notion might be a useful mid-range concept for bridging the chasm between the analytic level of the strategic personalistic leader and the level of the social and impersonal dynamics. Individuals do not rise to power out of will and ambition alone, nor is "society"

an all-encompassing structure. There are several repertoires that tell what a politician can or cannot do and how to look and not to look like. These can be strategically used, discarded, and challenged as well. They are *collective*, rather than purely social or individual.

Some repertoires seem to marry themselves better with a left-leaning ideology, as is the case with the social leader one. And it is surprising how the successful businessman template has become a truly formidable tool in the arsenal of right-wing parties and movements. Still, repertoires are also context-dependent. As noted before, sudden economic crises that lower social trust in mainstream parties and their accepted repertoires of leadership often create openings for new ones, bestowing legitimacy to ways of looking, being and talking that do not fit with pre-conceived notions.³⁵ Or the rise of a new template, such as the suddenly legitimate example of an African American president, might cause the desire in some to affirm the *old* templates that seem to be crumbling: feelings of social change and cultural insecurity seem to create a demand for the "old" strong-man trope.

There are, in short, no fixed formulas as to what might or might not work for a given critical juncture. Politically ambitious entrepreneurs scan the cultural landscape and seek to marry the established cultural repertoires with the external structures of opportunity. If they succeed, they might become the embodied representation of a new political identity, and even reshape the political system. They might even become the "new old thing": no longer new and exciting, no longer challenging, but simply inhabiting "the way things have always been". Thus, new opportunities for other ambitious outsiders will appear, and the cycle of politics will be renewed.

NOTES

1. For the purposes of this chapter, populism will be defined, following Francisco Panizza, as "an anti-status quo discourse that simplifies the political space by symbolically dividing society between 'the people' (as the 'underdogs') and its 'other'" (Panizza 2005, 3). In the discursive approach, both people and its other are conceptualized as discursively constructed: "Needless to say, the identity of both 'the people' and 'the other' are political constructs, symbolically constituted through the relation of antagonism, rather than sociological categories. Antagonism is thus a mode of identification in which the relation between its form (the

- people as signifier) and its content (the people as signified) is given by the very *process of naming* - that is, of establishing who the enemies of the people (and therefore the people itself) are" (Panizza 2005, 3, emphasis added).
2. For classic Greek political thought, the derogatory terms democracy and demagogue were both connected to the *demos*, the people. And the people's uprising was always linked to demagoguery. It was the demagogue who mobilized the people through the manipulation of their fears and resentments so that he could become a tyrant. Machiavelli believed that the people could not give itself rules and institutions, but they can preserve and enhance them ("...princes show themselves superior in the making of laws, and in the forming of civil institutions and new statutes and ordinances") (Machiavelli 1950, 264) ("...the people are superior in maintaining those institutions, laws, and ordinances, which certainly places them on a par with those who established them".) (Machiavelli 1950, 265). Only through the decisive and strategic action of a leader the true potential for a true Republican people could be achieved.
 3. Weyland (2001).
 4. Taggart (2000).
 5. Moffitt (2015), Mudde and Rovira (2017), Heinisch et al. (2017), Casullo and Freidenberg (2017).
 6. Laclau (2005, 129).
 7. Moffitt (2015, 84).
 8. Sigal and Verón (2003).
 9. Populist leaders always present themselves as outsiders with no links to traditional politicians, even though they usually recruit members of the 'partitocracy' once they get to power (Casullo and Freidenberg 2017).
 10. Sigal and Verón (2003).
 11. The progressive delegitimization of South-American mainstream parties as they were seen as part of the neoliberal consensus was described by Torre (1998), Roberts (2003), Panizza (2009) among others.
 12. "Cocalero" means coca-grower. Before entering party politics, Evo Morales was a prominent leader of the peasants of the Chapare region, whose main crop were coca leaves. Evo Morales was the most vocal critic against the "zero-coca" policies and compulsive más fumigation of coca crops that the Bolivian state implemented in coordination with the US government during the nineties. Morales was detained, beaten up and imprisoned by his activism. For references on the Cocalero movement and its impact on the MAS conformation see Grisaffi (2010), Neso (2013). For a comprehensive biography of Morales, see Sivak's *Jefazo* (2009). Also, Archondo (2009).
 13. There are some examples of social leaders or well-known public figures who transitioned into electoral politics in the US and Europe (such as Lech Walesa in Poland or Jesse Jackson in the US) but on the whole they did not become powerful presidents like Evo Morales or even Lula Da Silva. The route from civil society to political power as a pure outsider seems to be less open in these countries.
 14. Roberts (2012, 139), Barr (2009), Carreras (2012), Casullo and Freidenberg (2017).
 15. Ruzza (2017).
 16. The US two-party system has strong entrance barriers preventing outsider candidates. In the last few election cycles, however, these barriers seem to have been stronger in the Democratic party. As Vergari mentions, both Trump and Sanders are the result of a representation crisis, but only Trump could take hold of the party. The Democratic establishment stood firmly behind Hillary Clinton's nomination (Vergari 2017: 247, 249).
 17. Gratton (2016, 3).
 18. *Ibid.*, xi.
 19. The relation between Correa and social movements (indigenous as well as environmental) was contentious. Correa has been accused of demobilizing and co-opting social movements. See for instance De La Torre (2010).
 20. The former presidential candidate Marina Silva, who ran against Dilma Rousseff and the PT in 2014, was enrolled in the PT as environmental activist for many decades until she broke with the party.
 21. Skocpol and Williamson (2011).
 22. Heinisch and Saxonberg (2017, 209). It needs to be remembered that a populist strategy and discourse with pro-market, business-friendly ideology were thought to be incompatible until the nineties, when Roberts and Weyland coined the term "neoliberal populism". See Roberts (1995), Weyland (1999).
 23. Two other significant examples are Michael Bloomberg, the founder of the financial information company that became mayor of New York and flirted with the idea of running for president, and Mitt Romney, the finance mogul who was the Republican candidate for the presidency of the in 2012. None of them however were antagonistic populists, which might explain their lack of success.
 24. Two other businessmen-turned-presidents are Michel Temer in Brazil and the recently deposed Pedro Pablo Kuczynski in Peru. The two of them are clearly from the right, but they could not be considered populists.
 25. "It seems that all entrepreneurial populists have in common that they are catch-all and eschew a well-defined ideological framework. Instead,

they exhibit clear convictions about who is best fit to rule and how the country should be governed" (Heinisch and Saxonberg 2017, 211).

26. Moffitt 205, 66).
27. According to a piece by *Newsweek Magazine* on Palin's use of the term, she first used in 2008 in a speech before a pro-life group (Miller 2010). Her political action committee shot a political ad for the 2010 campaign entitled "Mama Grizzly", which can still be viewed in Youtube. After Bill, Sharon Angle, a conservative Republican candidate from Nevada, used the bear reference. While Palin's appeal has somewhat faded, she in April 2014 she introduced a fellow female Tea Party candidate, Jon Pons, as "a mama grizzly ready to take a stand against the Russian bear".
28. Sarah Palin is a good example of the process described by Mazzoleni: the interest of the media in a certain kind of outlandish yet media-savvy figure creates an opening for political entrepreneurs. Women can use this "media complicity" to their advantage, especially if they are telegenic (Mazzoleni 2008, 50).
29. Casullo (2018).
30. Scrinzi (2011).
31. Scholars have noted that European right-wing populist parties simultaneously denounce the supposedly 'backwards' treatment of women in the Islamic religion and present gender equality as a mark of Western civilization, while warning of "demographic decline" and denouncing Western women for not having enough children (Meret and Siim 2013).
32. Dingler et al. (2017, 346).
33. Ibid., 354.
34. Meret and Siim (2015, 4).
35. A process called "the exhaustion of the representative abilities of the centrist parties" (Casullo and Freidenberg 2014).

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CHAPTER 4

Populism and Contemporary Global Media: Populist Communication Logics and the Co-construction of Transnational Identities

Precious N. Chatterje-Doody and Rhys Crilley

INTRODUCTION

The academic study of populism has been well established since at least the 1960s. However, there remains significant contestation about what populism is, how to approach it, and what it offers either for understanding, and/or transforming contemporary politics. Furthermore, the study of populism has been influenced by its development in response to observable phenomena. First, existing studies usually focus on specific leaders or movements within nation-states in a relatively restricted geographical area. Second, the media is generally treated as a dissemination tool of such populist actors, rather than as a producer of populism in itself. Finally, the study of populism has engaged weakly with web 2.0

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"Exploring the often neglected nexus between populism and world politics, this innovative volume offers a comprehensive evaluation of the current populist moment by highlighting the significance of the foreign policy dimension. Timely and wide-ranging, this study not only broadens conventional approaches in both IR and populisms studies, but also provides much needed insights and explanations of one of the significant political developments of our unsettled times."

—**Manfred B. Steger**, Professor of Sociology, University of Hawai'i-Manoa, and Adjunct Professor of Global Studies, Western Sydney University, Australia

"What does populism tell us about international politics, and what does international politics tell us about populism? Surprisingly little as of yet—at least, surprisingly little that qualifies as rigorous scholarly analysis. The contributors to this fascinating, eclectic volume aim to correct this by probing these relationships both theoretically and comparatively, and through both domestic and international lenses. The result is much needed clarity about murky concepts and dynamics, and a clear to-do list for IR scholars."

—**David A. Welch**, CIGI Chair of Global Security, Balsillie School of International Affairs, and Professor of Political Science, University of Waterloo, Canada

This volume is the first to analyze populism's international dimension: its impact on, and interaction with, foreign policy and international politics. The contributions to this volume engage conceptual theoretical issues and overarching questions such as the still under-specified concept of populism or the importance of leadership and the mass media for populism's global rise. They zoom in on populism's effect on both different countries' foreign policies and core international concerns, including the future of the liberal world order and the chances for international conflict and cooperation more generally.

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