La crítica keynesiana al concepto frecuentista de la probabilidad

Abstract

Before turning to the economic field, J. M. Keynes dedicated more than a decade of his life to working almost exclusively on the concept of probability. The Keynesian conception of probability differs from the two main interpretative currents that dominate the field today, namely the frequentist and the subjective current. This article seeks to reconstruct Keynes criticism to the frequentist conception of probability, leaving aside its differences with the subjective vision. The arguments that Keynes used against the frequentist interpretation have not been sufficiently covered in the specialized literature, being usually overshadowed by other topics. The article shows how, from Keynes's perspective, the adoption of frequentism leads to the abandonment of probability as a guide to conduct, especially within the framework of inductive reasoning. Attempts to amend this problem inevitably lead to judgments of relevance such as those that Keynes made in his theory.